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Abstract 
Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures have become the main obstacles to some China’s traditional export product 
like tea since China’s accession to WTO. Different from previous researches, this paper approaches the problem from 
the perspective of SPS gap between China and importing countries. Based on the panel data of China and its 10 
developed trade partners during 1992 to 2013, it applies gravity model to quantify the effects of SPS gap both in quality 
(i.e use Maximum Residual Limits of fenvalerate and endosulfan as proxy) and in quantity (i.e regulated numbers of 
Maximum Residual Limits) between China and its partners on China’s tea export, the results attribute China’s tea 
restricted by SPS measures to the big gaps from developed countries in maximal residual limits of pesticides and 
numbers of regulated pesticides. 
Keywords: Food Safety Standard; SPS measures; Tea Exports; Maximum Residual Limits (MRLs)  
1. Introduction 
After the Uruguay round negotiations, agricultural products have been incorporated into the multilateral trade 
regulations. With the implementation of the Agreement of Agriculture, tariff level has been substantially cut down 
(Trienekens & Zuurbier, 2008), the average global tariff on agricultural products reduced from 20.2% in 1995 to 12.5% 
in 2013 (Note 1). However, some emerging food safety standards, especially sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, 
replaced the tariff, became the main obstacles to agricultural trade (Henson et al., 2005; Disdier et al., 2008; Henson and 
Humphrey, 2010). During the period of 1995 to 2013, the number of WTO/SPS notifications
 
of agricultural products 
increased from 131 to 655 (Note 2). This sharp increase in the number of SPS notifications indicates that the importing 
countries have paid great attention to food safety issues. This change also has a broad impact on export of agro-products, 
especially an obvious negative effect on products exporting from developing countries to developed countries (Otsuki & 
Wilson, 2001; Jongwanich, 2009; Neeliah & Goburdhun, 2010). 
As a developing country, China's agro-product trade is also not exempt from the adverse influence of SPS measures 
(Note 3). In 2013, over 1904 batches of China's agro-products were refused or detained by the United States, Japan, EU, 
Canada and South Korea, the major trade partners of China (Note 4). According to the survey of China's General 
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ, 2012), there were 50.8 percent of China's 
agricultural exporting firms being affected by foreign SPS measures in 2011. China’s advantage varieties of 
agro-products such as vegetables, seafood, honey and meat have been struck by SPS measure from developed countries 
(Dong & Jiang, 2012; Song & Beghin, 2014). 
China is the world largest tea producer and a major exporter. China’s tea accounts for about 1/3 of world production and 
1/7 of world export, respectively. Since late 1990s, it has increasingly been restricted by the SPS measures in developed 
countries, especially EU, Japan and USA. Some studies find SPS regulation and food safety standards have become the 
main obstacles of tea export. Gu et al. (2007) find that pesticide residue is the main factor restraining China’s tea from 
exporting to Germany and Japan, main destinations of Chinese tea. Sun et al. (2007) , by calculating the cost of 
pesticides denotes that the change of EU maximal residual limits (MRLs) in 2003 increased the cost of China’s tea 
production and decrease of China’s tea export to EU. Xu and Gao (2006) conclude that China’s tea export is 
significantly restricted by foreign TBT/SPS since 1999. The research by Qiu et al. (2009), applying the Granger 
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causality test, shows that export scale, the domestic tea production and foreign SPS measures are the main determinants 
hindering China’s tea export. Wei et al. (2012) measure the effects of MRLs for pesticides imposed by importers on 
China’s tea export, and conclude that if the stringency of foreign MRLs for endosulfan and fenvalerate increase by 1%, 
China’s tea export would decrease by 22%.   
The exiting researches, either taking the SPS measures in importing countries as a qualitative variable (dummy) or 
adopting directly the maximal residue limits of pesticides in importer side into the gravity equation, study the effects of 
SPS on China’s tea export by taking Chinese SPS measures as static factors. In fact, Chinese standards for tea are 
dynamic since government has made numbers of revisions in last two decades. If China has a higher control standard 
than its partner, then the SPS standards of importing countries will hardly stop or obstruct China’s tea export, and visa 
verse. Clearly, it would be more interesting from a policy perspective to explore the gap of SPS measures between 
China and its partners and their effects on China’s tea export. This paper pioneers to study the effects of the SPS 
difference both in quantity and quality between China and developed countries on China's tea export, aim to better 
understand the restriction factors and offer proactive measures to deal with the problems. 
2. Review of China’s Tea Export 
Chinese tea export experiences some big changes in last two decades. First, the export grows disproportionately to the 
production. During 1992 to 2011, tea production grows by 5.62% annually; and its proportion to world's total production 
rises from 23% to 35% (see Figure 1). In the same period, tea export increases by 3.25% annually and its share in world 
total keep constant (see Figure 2). According to our calculation, the average annual export growth of China's tea shows a 
downward trend, i.e. drops from 5.9% during 1996～2000 to 4.5% during 2001～2005 and further to 1.1% during 
2006～2011; whereas those of China's tea production during the three periods are 2.75%, 6.25 % and 9% (Note 5). 
Obviously, the growth of tea production is mainly driven by domestic consumption, rather than abroad demand. 
Second, export price is lower than other competitors. From 1992 to 2011, the unit price of China's tea is not only lower 
than the world average for 15%-20%, but also lower than that of major exporting countries (see Figure 3). For example, 
China’s export price is only 65% of Sri Lanka in 2011. Relative lower export price, on one hand, might be the result of 
low quality or the prevalence competitive strategy. But on the other hand, it indicates that Chinese tea is just an ordinary 
product, rather than the active player of high-end market. 
 
Figure 1. China’s tea production and its share in world’s tea production during 1992 to 2012  
Data source: FAO database（http://www.fao.org/statistics） 
 
Figure 2. China’s tea export and share in world’s total export during 1992 to 2011 
Data source: FAO database (http://www.fao.org/statistics) 
Third, export destination has switched from developed countries to developing countries. There’re about 200 countries 
and regions import tea from China in 2013 (Note 6). The top forty markets are mostly located in Africa, Europe and 
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Uzbekistan, USA, Mauritania, and Japan. Only Morocco’s import accounts for nearly 20% of China’s the total exports 
(Note 7) .The European Union used to be the major importer of Chinese tea. But after the year 2000, their imports grew 
sluggishly. Currently, among other developed countries, Japan is the second largest importer of China’s tea. But from 
2009 to 2013, its imports decreased by 1.94% annually. Due to the different growth performance, the share of developed 
markets in total China's tea exports fell from 51.32% in 1996 to 22.91% in 2013(see Figure 4).  
Finally, SPS regulation became the main constraint of tea export to developed markets. Since 1995, the tariff on 
agricultural products has dropped substantially, of which the average tariff level for China’s tea declines from 22.4% in 
1996 to 10.1% in 2013, nearly a 55 percentage drop. At the same time, the notifications of SPS measures from WTO 
members present an upward trend (see Figure 5), especially from the EU and Japan, whose notifications account for 
60-70% of all for tea.   
 
Figure 3. International comparison of tea export price 
Data source: FAO database（http://www.fao.org/statistics） 
 
Figure 4. The change trend of the share of China's tea export to developed countries 
Data source: UN trade database (http://unctadstat.unctad.org) 
 
Figure 5.The tariff level for Chinese tea and the number of notifications of SPS 
Source: According to calculated data from TRAINS database and SPS-IMS database of WTO. 
3. Gap in SPS standards and the Effects on Tea Export 
SPS measures include regulation, standards of maximal residue limits, inspection procedures and sampling methods. 
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an additional expenditure paid by exporters to comply with the SPS requirements in importing countries (Henson & 
Heasman, 1998). Based on the hierarchy development level, the costs of compliance for different exporters are 
heterogeneous. For some, the cost of compliance may exceed the compliance benefits and it will force them to exit. If 
more exporters fail to comply with the SPS measures in importing countries, then the exports of the country will 
declines. When SPS measures are beyond the capability of exporters such as lacking of facilities of compliance or 
human resource, they will lead to trade restriction or even de facto trade ban for exporters (Wilson & Otsuki, 2004; 
Anders & Caswell, 2009; Li, 2014). 
The crucial limitation for exporters to comply with SPS is that their SPS standards are much lower or laggard than those 
in importing countries, i.e. the gap in control magnitude of SPS measures between importing and exporting countries 
(Dong & Jiang, 2012). In general, developed countries set much higher requirements for food safety, flora and fauna as 
well as environment requirements owing to their higher income. So their SPS measures are much stricter than those of 
developing countries, whom being ruled out of the markets of developed countries due to high cost of compliance 
(Wilson & Otsuki, 2004; Manarungsan et al, 2005). 
3.1 SPS gap in quantity affects the cost of compliance  
The differences of SPS measures are reflected in control scopes for risk, for example, pathogenic bacteria, veterinary 
drug, pesticides, pollutants, leading to uneven coverage of regulated pesticides, is defined herein as the quantity gap of 
SPS measures. Advanced technology in identifying hazards and their sources make them possible for developed 
countries to set control standards for wide-range of pesticides, or even one pesticide establish different MRLs standards 
on different parts of animal(head, body, and liver) or plant (root, stem, and leave). Extensive coverage of pesticide and 
the refinement of control standards ensure a high-level protection for food safety and environmental safety. Whereas 
developing countries, short of identifying technology and analyzing methods, only a small number of agro-products or 
just a few of pesticides are regulated. As a result, they set up less MRLs standards. Lots of food or agro-goods have no 
pesticide control standards, or constant MRLs are made for different products or different pesticides. When the SPS 
standards’ number of exporting countries is less than that of importing countries, firms of exporting countries will have 
to bear additional cost of compliance and a high probability to be hindered by SPS. Moenius (2004) argues that the 
common standards or unilateral standards of exporting countries will promote bilateral trade, whereas the unilateral 
standards of importing countries restrict bilateral trade. Thus, we propose the first hypothesis, i.e. China’s tea export is 
restricted by the SPS gap in quantity (i.e. number of MRLs) between China and developed countries. 
3.2 SPS gap in quality affects the cost of compliance 
The gap of SPS measures among countries is embodied not only as the coverage of hazards including infective loimia, 
insect invasion, biological pathogens, chemical residues and physical pollution, but also as the level of stringency of 
SPS. For example, consumers in developed countries are more sensitive for the risk, so their SPS standards such as 
maximal residue limits have low tolerance for pesticides, namely they have more intensive or stringent MRLs. Contrary 
to the developed countries, the consumers in developing countries, due to income constraint, are more tolerance for risk. 
Therefore, food safety standards in developing countries are less harsh. The heterogeneous stringency of MRLs is 
defined as quality gap of SPS measures in this paper. Developing countries will face high cost of compliance when their 
looser control standards are raised to comply with the stringent SPS ones of developed countries (Maskus et al., 2005; 
Chen et al, 2008). The maximal residue limits of pesticide are the major forms and main barrier of exporters from 
developing countries confronting, therefore the discrepancy of SPS measures are largely reflected in the gap of pesticide 
residue limits between developing and developed countries (Drogué & DeMaria, 2012). As far as tea production is 
concerned, pesticides are commonly used to control insects and pests. If developed countries set less tolerance of 
pesticide residue than China, Chin’s exporting firms have to bear high cost of compliance, tea exports would be 
hindered. Thus, the second hypothesis of this paper is the gap in MRLs of chemical between China and developed 
partners would restrict China’s tea exports. 
4. Model Specification and Data description  
To study the effects of SPS measures on trade flows, scholars commonly introduce SPS, as a kind of factor affecting 
trade costs, into the classical gravity model (Otsuki & Wilson, 2001; Wei et al., 2012,e.g.), adopting maximum residual 
limits (Otsuki & Wilson, 2001; Neeliah & Goburdhun, 2010; Dong, 2011,e.g.), HACCP standard (Anders & Caswell, 
2009; Liu & Yue, 2012,e.g.) or SPS notification number as a proxy of SPS measures (Disdier et al., 2008; Xiong & 
Beghin, 2011; Qin & Ni, 2013). Based on the previous studies, we introduce the SPS gaps both in quantity and quality 
for tea between China and developed countries into gravity model, using the trade data between China and 10 major 
developed countries, namely, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, Japan, the United 
States, Canada, and Australia during 1992 to 2013, to explore the impact of SPS measures differences on China’s tea 
export. Our model express as: 
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Where, Expit , stands for China’s tea exports to the 10 developed countries, is the dependent variable, data come from 
UNCTAD. Gniet and Gniit are the per capita gross national income (GNI) of China and importing countries, respectively. 
Since tea is healthy food, demand for tea will increase with the growth of China's per capita income, as well as the 
awareness of consumers’ health consciousness; thus, the coefficient of variable Gniet is expected to be negative. Data of 
these two variables are downloaded from database of World Bank, and have been processed by eliminating the effect of 
price and exchange rate fluctuations. Dis is the distance between capitals of China and its trade partners. The data are 
collected from the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives etd’ Informations Internationales (CEPIIs). Prod stands for China’s tea 
annual production, the large amount of production means abundant supply for export. In this paper, we use one-year 
lagged production to avoid potential endogenous problem. Data are from FAO database. Tariff denotes simple average 
tariff imposed on China’s tea by the importing countries. Data are taken from the Trade Analysis Information System 
(TRAINS) of the UNCTAD. (Note 8) 
Our key variables (Fenet-Fenit) and (Sulet-Sulit) are introduced to measure the difference of MRLs of chemicals between 
China and its partner countries. We subtract the fenvalerate and endosulfan MRLs of importing country i from that of 
China respectively to measure the SPS gap in quality. If the difference is zero, it denotes that the common MRLs 
standard is implemented in both export and import countries, otherwise it means the control MRLs discrepancy. The 
positive difference represents that tea maximum residue limits set in China are less strict than that in developed 
countries. The larger the value is, the greater is the differences on control standards between China and developed 
countries, and China’s exporters have to bear large cost of compliance and have less advantage in price, and therefore 
the total tea export will decline, i.e. a converse relationship exists. Strictly speaking, we should collect all the MRLs of 
chemicals on tea for accurate measurement. However, it’s very difficult to get all pesticide standards over 1992 to 2013 
for sample countries. What gratified is not all pesticide residues are inspected in trade, and only few of them play 
crucial role to affect trade. Fenvalerate and endosulfan MRLs fluctuate sharply and become reasons of China’s tea being 
detained or rejected in importing countries. The data of the variables are collected from Global MRL database, the tea 
expert advisory system, the European Food Safety Net, Tea Research Institute and Fujian Academy of Agricultural 
Sciences. (Note 9) 
(Numit-Numet), the difference between MRLs number of developed countries and that of China, measures the SPS gap in 
quantity. If the value is positive, it means developed countries have more MRLs standards than China, China’s tea 
exporters have to bear cost of compliance, and thereby the export will be easily subject to constraint. The relationship of 
these two variables is expected negative. The data of this variable are from the Tea-trading Net and China 
WTO/TBT-SPS Notification and Enquiry Net. (Note 10) 
(Dsamp) denotes sampling method of residue detection. As a beverage, tea itself is not consumed directly; people drink 
the soup by diluting tea with boiled water. Therefore, traditional sampling method is taken from the soup, i.e. tea 
infusion. According to the characteristics of tea, the pesticide residues are diluted, and normally export tea is easy to be 
qualified. However, the EU and Japan adjusted their sampling method of residue from soup tea to dry tea, i.e. inspect 
the residue of tea itself in 1998 and 2006 respectively. The dry tea method significantly ascends the accurate rate of 
detection, and has more probability to detect the pesticide residue in tea. Therefore, a dummy variable is used to capture 
the sampling method on the China’s tea export, and we set value as "0" if the sample is the soup tea or "1" when sample 
is taken from ―dry tea" in developed countries, a negative relationship is expected. 

 is the error term, used to capture 
the residue of missing variables. The descriptive statistics of the main variables in this model are shown in Table 1.  
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Variable  
Variable      Description     Mean   Std. Dev    Min   Max   Exp. Sign 
Exp Export value (10,000 U.S.$） 1563.89 2131.67 5.46 10539 + 
GNIet GNI per capita of exp. countries（U.S.$） 2043.18 1807.71 370 6560 + 
GNIit GNI per capita of Imp. countries （U.S.$） 32935.14 10050.72 18560 65520 + 
Prodt-1 A year-lag prod（10KT） 91.50 35.70 57.60 171.49 + 
Dist Distance（Kilometer） 8047.30 2295.24 2103 11172 - 
Fenet-Fenit 
Gap of chemical 1 between exp. & imp. 
countries（ppm） 
-1.32 3.61 -8 1.99 - 
Sulet-Sulit 
Gap of chemical 2 between exp. & imp. 
countries（ppm） 
3.23 12.08 -20 29.99 - 
Numit-Numet 
Number gap of Standards betw. imp.& 
exp. countries 
96.07 86.90 -19 267 - 
Dsamp Sampling method of residue  0.47 0.50 0 1 - 
Tariff Simple average tariff   (%) 1.95 3.54 0 14.58 - 
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5. Empirical Results 
First of all, we run the model by using OLS, country-specific fixed effect and random effect respectively. Compare the 
result of F test and Hausman test, it turns out that random effect is the best one. But it suffers from a lot of econometric 
issues. Among them the log-linearization of the variables can lead to biased estimations in presence of 
heteroskedasticity as stated by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006, 2011). They suggest using the Poisson Maximum 
Likelihood (PPML) method, which can help dealing with heteroskedasticity. Results show that the variables have 
expected signs and significant at 1% to 10% confidence level, which mean our estimations are reliable (see Table 2).  
In all models, many of the estimated coefficients of the control variables have the signs that are intuitive. The signs, as 
well as the confidence levels, are robust even when using alternative econometric approaches (OLS, random-effect or 
PPML model). For example, the estimated coefficient for an importing country's GNI is positive and highly significant 
(at 1% level of statistical significance) in all columns, which means rising incomes in importing countries increase the 
countries' import demand for tea. Similarly, all coefficients for tea production variables are also significantly positive. 
The coefficients for distance variables have negative signs and statistically significant as expected. The coefficient of 
the tariff variable is also consistent across the different specifications of models except using the OLS estimation. 
Table 2. The estimated results of gravity model 
 OLS FE RE PPML  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ln(GNIex) -1.489
*** -1.233*** -1.218*** -1.243*** -0.543*** -0.556*** 
 (0.553) (0.238) (0.237) (0.237) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(GNIim) 3.900
*** 1.153*** 1.158*** 1.139*** 0.912*** 0.823*** 
 (0.594) (0.340) (0.338) (0.338) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Dist) 0.818 -- -4.270*** -4.529*** -3.165*** -3.222*** 
 (0.828) -- (1.369) (1.354) (0.589) (0.592) 
ln(Prod t-1) 2.142
* 3.743*** 3.709*** 3.801*** 2.173*** 2.255*** 
 (1.276) (0.550) (0.548) (0.545) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fenet-Fenit -0.024 -0.021 -0.021  -0.016
***  
 (0.028) (0.016) (0.016)  (0.000)  
Sulet-Sulit -0.019
** -0.009* -0.009* -0.009* -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
Numit-Numet -0.006
*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Dsamp 0.945** 0.651*** 0.649*** 0.579*** 0.237*** 0.194*** 
 (0.368) (0.166) (0.165) (0.156) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tariff 0.269** -0.362*** -0.336*** -0.366*** -0.280*** -0.286*** 
 (0.106) (0.102) (0.100) (0.0978) (0.000) (0.000) 
cons -50.91*** -37.36*** 0.990 2.577 10.40** 10.85** 
 (14.68) (5.927) (12.81) (12.75) (5.261) (5.288) 
Observations 220 220 220 220 220 220 
R-squared 0.516 0.607 0.607 0.604 0.728  
F Test F=121.27 （p=0.000） -    
Hausman Test - H=3.08（p=0.901）    
Note:*, **and***indicate significance at the levels of 10%, 5%and 1% respectively. 
The variable of number difference of MRLs is significant at 1% confidence level in all five models, and the regression 
coefficient is -0.006, suggesting that number of MRLs of chemicals of developed countries is larger by one unit than 
that in China, China’s tea export would correspondingly decrease by 0.6%. The significant result shows that the 
difference in numbers of SPS measures between China and developed countries will affect China's tea export; i.e. SPS 
gap in quantity will constrain China's tea export. By now, the first hypothesis of this paper has been verified. 
In May 2001, Japan enacted new standards on tea, which added the items of tea pesticide residue limits from 24 in 1992 
to 76, then to 276 since the implementation of the Positive List System in 2006. Prior to 2000, the number of pesticide 
residue limits of tea in the EU was only 62, and then it increased to 134 in 2000, 193 in 2003, and further to 227 in 2007. 
Meanwhile, China has been also endeavoring to improve its domestic pesticide residue limits standards as the 
developed countries did. Since 2009, the number of MRLs of food has increased to 2319, among which, the MRLs for 
tea has also reached 27. However, the difference in number of MRLs, or quantity gap between China and developed 
countries is widening. Because of these enlarging differences, some pesticides are regulated or controlled or even 
banned in developed countries may have not been restricted or controlled in China yet, which directly stop China's tea 
export to developed countries. As shown in figure 6, with the quantity gap widening, the volume ratio of China’s tea 
export to EU and Japan in China’s total export declines, with an inverse relationship. 
Meanwhile, the negative sign and statistical significance of SPS difference of endosulfan and fenvalerate MRLs support 
that SPS gap in quality will constrain China's tea export. The estimated coefficient of fenvalerate suggests the 
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difference of fenvalerate MRLs between China and developed countries shrinks by 1 ppm; China’s tea export would 
increase correspondingly by 1.6% (column (5), Table 2). The estimated coefficient of endosulfan is 0.007 in the PPML 
model, which means, on the margin, a 1ppm decrease in the difference of endosulfan MRLs between China and 
developed countries will raise bilateral tea trade by approximately 0.7%. One possible explanation for why the impact 
of the MRLs of endosulfan is smaller is that the EU reset its MRLs of endosulfan in tea from 0.01ppm back to the 
Codex level (30 ppm) in 2007 after being executed for less than two years because of the opposition of exporting 
countries including China. By now, the second hypothesis of this paper has been proved.  
 
  
Figure 6. The number difference of pesticide residue limits standards between China and foreign countries and the share of EU’s 
and Japanese market of China’s tea export during 1992 to 2013. 
Data source: UN Comtrade Database (http://comtrade.un.org/data) 
Dummy variable Dsamp (sampling method of residue detection) is significant at the 1% confidence level, but its 
regression coefficient is positive, which is not accordant with the expectation. One possible reason is only small size of 
samples used in this paper. Another potential reason is only small amount of tea export to the developed countries which 
use dried-tea sampling method.  
6. Conclusion and Policy Implication 
China is the world largest tea producer, as well as a major exporter. With the execution of the "agricultural agreement" 
and the "SPS agreement" signed in the Uruguay round negotiations, the tariff level of tea has fallen sharply, while SPS 
measures in WTO members, particularly the developed countries, tended to be stricter, in a form of the rising number of 
MRLs and the more stringent requirement of pesticide residue limits. Although China also improves its SPS standard 
for tea constantly, the gap of the SPS measures between China and developed countries is widening either in quality 
(i.e., the level of pesticide residue limits) or quantity (i.e., the number of pesticide residue control standards). As a result, 
China's tea export price goes down, and the export market has been shifting from developed countries to developing 
countries. Based on data of China and its 10 developed trade partner countries during 1992 to 2013, this paper applies 
gravity model to investigate the influence of the discrepancy of SPS measures in quantity and quality between China 
and developed countries on China's tea export. The empirical results show that while the differences of Maximum 
Residual Limits of fenvalerate and endosulfan between China and developed countries increases by 1 ppm, China’s tea 
export would correspondingly decrease by 1.6% and 0.7%, respectively; while the differences of regulated number of 
pesticide residue limits between China and developed countries increases by 1 unit, China’s tea export would 
correspondingly decrease by 0.6%. The differences in SPS measures both in quality and quantity are the main 
determinants of China’s tea restricted by the SPS measures in developed countries. 
Based on the results, the policy implication is obvious. For the sustainable development of China’s tea, it would be 
better for China focus on the control of pesticide residues, striving to narrow the differences of pesticide residue control 
standards of tea in quality and quantity between China and developed countries. First of all, it should abolish the 
overlapped or old standards, increase the coverage of regulated pesticides and refine the MRLs, to reduce the number 
differences in standards with that of developed countries. Secondly, risk assessment of hazard and harmful material in 
tea should be the core of any revision at national level or industry level, or for setting up new SPS standards. For export 
firms, reform proactively their production technology and adopt the standards of international core markets to promote 
the tea quality. In addition, China must voice in the formulation of international standards. China’s green tea exports 
accounts for 3/4 of the exports of China’s tea. Therefore, authorities departments must strengthen the risk assessment of 
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IPPC proactively. If the tea standards of China are accepted by most countries and became the Codex standards, it will 
greatly facilitate China’s tea export. 
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Notes  
Note 1. The data are estimated according to the TRAINS database of WTO (http://stat.wto.org) 
Note 2. According to the requirement of WTO / SPS agreement, all the members have to notify the newly established 
SPS measures or amendments to the initial measures. The data are collected from the SPS-IMS database of WTO 
(http://spsims.wto.org). 
Note 3. According to SPS agreement, SPS measures are regulations, standards, methods and requirements, including the 
processing and production methods, testing, inspection, and certification and approval procedures, quarantine treatment, 
statistics, sampling and risk assessment methods, as well as packaging and labeling requirements directly related to food 
safety，animal and plant health and environment safety. 
Note 4. The data are collected from the WTO-TBT / SPS notification center of AQSIQ (http://www.tbt-sps.gov.cn). 
Note 5. Source: data in this section are calculated according to the data of Chinese tea production in FAO database 
(http://www.fao.org/statistics). 
Note 6. Source: United Nations Trade Database UNCTAD (http://unctadstat.unctad.org). 
Note 7. Data in this section is calculated according to the trade data of China’s importers in United Nations Trade 
Database (http://unctadstat.unctad.org). 
Note 8. Data in this section come from UNCTAD (http://unctadstat.unctad.org), World Bank 
database(http://data.worldbank.org) , CEPIIs (http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/), and FAO database 
(http://www.fao.org/statistics). The interval of production data in model is 1991～2010. 
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Note 9. Data in this section are collected from Global MRL database (https://www.globalmrl.com/), the tea expert 
advisory system (http://www.scnjkj.gov.cn), the European Food Safety Net (http://www.efsa.europa.eu) and Tea 
Research Institute and Fujian Academy of Agricultural Sciences (http://www.faas.cn). 
Note 10. Data in this section are collected from Tea Trade Net (http://www.tea-trading.com ) and China 
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